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This paper studies government support which targets industries capable of learning.
Monitoring procedures are implemented to prevent rent-seekers from non-learning indus-
tries. But this involves bureaucratic red tape that reduces ﬂexibility in response to world
market shocks. The main thrust of this study is that, as an economy develops, the bal-
ance shifts endogenously between the need for bureaucratic monitoring and the desirability
for ﬂexibility. An optimal strategy may be to support learning, with a certain degree of
bureaucracy at an early stage when necessary, but to liberalize the policy toward laissez
faire, as the economy matures. The results appear be consistent with empirical evidences
in Asian countries.
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11 Introduction
In the early stage of development, many countries, particularly those in Asia, adopt industrial
policies to support industries enjoying priority. Later on, policy makers emphasize the need
to liberalize and approach laissez faire (see, e.g., Rao (1996) for India, Kuo (1995) for Taiwan,
SaKong (1993) for Korea, and Komiya (1988) for Japan). Industrial policies typically undergo a
continuous sequence of policy reforms over time. In general, they consist of government support
and bureaucratic control. This paper focuses on three distinct aspects of industrial policies. The
ﬁrst aspect is that government support promotes learning, and the second is that bureaucratic
control is imposed against rent-seekers. As the third aspect, which we emphasize the most in
this study, bureaucratic control induces red tape in the sense that it makes private sectors less
ﬂexible in response to world market shocks. There are two main questions not yet resolved in the
literature: (1) How do these aspects relate to each other? (2) Are the observed policy reforms the
correction of past errors by the present decision makers, or do such reforms reﬂect the optimal
transition of the policy design to adapt to the changed circumstances? This paper addresses
such questions in both intuitive and analytical terms.
The need for production ﬂexibility in a world with variable demand has been emphasized in
the recent literature (see, e.g., Beckman (1990), Killick (1995), and Deyo and Doner (2001)).
As case studies, Amsden (1985) and Subrathan (1991) comment on the ability to provide fast
delivery as critical to success in the competitive international machine tool market. Industrial
policies often reduce ﬂexibility due to complex bureaucratic procedures. Desai (1985) points out
that complex state controls over industries in pre-reform India have rendered them uncompetitive
in the world market despite their various latent strength. This fact suggests that the decline of
ﬂexibility due to bureaucracy can hamper the potential economic development. On the other
hand, even at some cost to ﬂexibility, some degree of bureaucratic control may be needed against
rent-seekers, who abuse developmental policy for individual interest. Thus, balancing the issues
of ﬂexibility, rent-seeking and bureaucracy is critically important for policy makers.
To our knowledge, few studies have analyzed policy reforms taking into account the loss
1in ﬂexibility due to bureaucracy in the economics literature.1 Lin and Wan (1996) examined
empirical evidences from Asian countries and showed that strict bureaucracy engenders a loss
in ﬂexibility in a static setting. In the present paper, an industrial policy refers to the support
for the ﬁrms that induce dynamic learning externalities. In order to describe this phenomenon,
modelling theoretically such an issue in a dynamic setting is vital to examine the optimal design
of an industrial policy.
There have been on-going debates about the eﬀectiveness of industrial policies. At least from
the theoretical perspective, our results agree with Itoh, Kiyono, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Suzumura
(1991) in that temporary industrial policies may be valuable. Moreover, the development pro-
cess, viewed as a episode of ‘catching-up’ in ‘late-industrialization,’ may call for an endogenous
policy sequence, with justiﬁed government participation in early stages and continued liberaliza-
tion toward laissez faire. Balancing the shifting weights of beneﬁt against cost of government
interventions, an optimal policy sequence has its own rhythm and timing for policy reforms.
Therefore, the nature of policy reform might not be a transition from past error to present
sagacity, but the adaptation to the change in circumstance.
Our model also shows whether a certain degree of bureaucracy is deemed tolerable under
an industrial policy at an early stage of development. The degree of bureaucracy depends on
two important issues; the ﬁrst is the rent-seeking issue in which rent-seekers make an industrial
policy less eﬀective, and the second is the ﬂexibility issue in which bureaucratic red tape hurts
ﬂexibility in the world market with variable demand. Elaborate bureaucratic procedures preclude
the rent-seeking issue but give rise to the ﬂexibility issue. Thus, elaborate bureaucracy can be
justiﬁed if the rent-seeking issue is relatively signiﬁcant, but not if the ﬂexibility issue is relatively
signiﬁcant. This result has important policy implication. The lack of competitiveness of export
industries in pre-reform India (Desai (1985)) may be attributed to strict administrative controls
under frequent market shifts in the world market.
Moreover, we ﬁnd it plausible that policy makers should seek to reduce in complexity of
1Although there are many studies on aspects of production ﬂexibility under demand uncertainty (e.g.,
Turnovsky (1973) and Epstein (1978)), the impacts of demand variability, which directly aﬀects the ﬂexibility, on
the optimal policy are hardly examined in the context of dynamic settings.
2bureaucratic procedures before an ultimate transition to laissez faire. An administrative reform
may also be an optimal action reﬂecting the change in circumstance. This ﬁnding may be
consistent with the fact that in many countries, administrative reforms to simplify bureaucratic
procedures have become the slogans of the day even though industry targeting still holds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes what constitutes beneﬁts
and costs of bureaucracy in the development context and analyzes what serves as the force for
the change in the balance of the costs and the beneﬁts. In Section 3, we presents a dynamic
model for a small open economy with industries capable of learning, the presence of potential
rent-seekers and variable market demands. We also introduce government actions consisting of
both government support and bureaucratic control. Section 4 derives the optimal policy for the
model and shows some important results. Casting beneﬁts and costs of an industrial policy in
analytic terms, we argue that each policy package may be appropriate to proper circumstances.
Section 5 provides a summary as conclusion. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Beneﬁt and Cost of Bureaucracy
To lay the foundations for subsequent analysis, this section examines the interdependence among
the three aspects of industrial policies introduced in the previous section. These aspects are
closely related to beneﬁts and costs of bureaucracy. In the present context, the objective of
industrial policies is to promote industries with dynamic learning eﬀect that meets the Kemp
criterion (Kemp (1960)).2 We assume that all industries desire government support for their own
interest, but some industries would contribute to more learning when supported. The pace of
learning may be less than ideal without an industrial policy.
First, we clarify the beneﬁt of bureaucracy. The ubiquity of bureaucratic procedures is
the result of neither coincidence nor malice. The administrative problem is that of potential
2For an early study on learning-by-doing, in which technological progress is the serendipitous by-product of
experience gained in the production, see, e.g., Arrow (1962). The direction of an industrial policy is decided
by various criteria, developed by Mill, Bastable, Kemp and Negishi. See, e.g., Itoh, Kiyono, Okuno-Fujiwara,
and Suzumura (1991). In particular, Kemp (1960) showed a crucial condition for an industrial policy, known as
the Kemp criterion, requiring that beneﬁts from technological progress over time cannot be obtained by private
incentives due to dynamic learning externalities. This condition justiﬁes a targeted industrial policy, whereby
some industries with such learning eﬀect should be targeted while others remain non-targeted.
3misclassiﬁcation of commodities. This problem arises because of industry targeting. If there
is any ambiguity about the appropriate classiﬁcation for a commodity, private ﬁrms in non-
targeted industries have an incentive to make it appear to ﬁt into a targeted category (see,
e.g., Corden (1990) for a tariﬀ case).3 Information asymmetry between the administrator and
applicants would allow some non-learning industries to receive support. This makes an industrial
policy less eﬀective and might lower an attainable welfare through policy dilution. Bureaucratic
controls play an important role in precluding this problem. We call such control as bureaucratic
monitoring. Bureaucratic monitoring takes the form of bureaucratic routines (e.g., requiring
documentation of the merits of the claim). The purpose of bureaucratic monitoring in this
paper is not so much to prevent shirking by the agent, a concern in standard principal-agent
problems, but rather to make the policy of industrial promotion more eﬀective by excluding from
government assistance those whose claims are without merit.
Second, we identify the cost of bureaucracy. In the present study, ﬂexibility is deﬁned as the
adaptability in modifying designs and the capability of timely response to market variability.
Bureaucratic monitoring brings about the loss in ﬂexibility. Private ﬁrms waste their time and
energy due to complex bureaucratic procedures. Thus, the degree of monitoring determines the
cost of bureaucracy.4 This element is quite important in the globalized era. There have been
many case studies on the impact of bureaucratic monitoring on ﬂexibility. Roy (1996) states
that in some cases hundreds of documents must be submitted to complete a single transaction
in pre-reform India. Subrathan (1991) also mentions that there is a 6-10 months delay in getting
approval of licenses to import components for production in Indian’s machine tool industry.
Appelbaum and Smith (2001) state that a relative lack of regulation contributes to making
Chinese factories in the garment industry so ﬂexible.
Finally, we discuss about the change of beneﬁt and cost of bureaucracy over time. Matching
the elements of beneﬁt and cost, we can arrive at an optimal policy package, consisting of govern-
3As another type of rent-seeking activities, there is the concept of ‘rent-seeking’, in which government and
bureaucracy are easily subject to persuasion and inﬂuence from businessmen aﬀected by tariﬀs and quotas. See,
e.g., Krueger (1974) and Bhagwati (1982).
4The administrative cost may also be signiﬁcant, but we ignore it to focus on the eﬀect of bureaucratic
monitoring on ﬂexibility.
4ment support and bureaucratic monitoring, under given any circumstance. For the developing
countries, learning often means the catching up with advanced countries, through tapping into
the ‘technology backlog,’ that is, the technology gap. As development proceeds, the scope for
learning is reduced (see, e.g., Mansﬁeld, Rapoport, Romero, Villani, Wagner, and Husic (1977)
and Kuznets (1982)).5 Since elaborate bureaucracy is imposed to enhance learning by avoiding
policy dilution, as the scope of learning declines, so does the beneﬁt of bureaucracy. In contrast,
the nature of the cost of bureaucracy does not change over time. So far as bureaucracy is con-
cerned, proportionately speaking, the economy may face a reduction in beneﬁt but not in cost
over time. As circumstances change, so does the optimal policy. Thus, it is quite important to
examine optimal policy sequence in a dynamic setting.
3 The Model
3.1 Basic Elements
Consider a small open economy with an inﬁnite period and a continuum of commodities.6 Com-
modities are indexed on the interval [0,1]. Commodity z, which is produced in industry z, is
associated with each point on the interval. Each industry can be categorized as either a learning
industry or a non-learning industry. Learning industries are represented as the subset [0,K] of
interval [0,1], and non-learning industries as the subset (K,1], where K ∈ (0,1) is ﬁxed. The
international price of all commodities is nomalized to unity, and the total labor input in the
economy is ﬁxed at ¯ L > 0 in all periods.
Human capital Ht is a public good for production beneﬁtting all producers equally. Only the
production in learning industries contributes to human capital accumulation through learning-
by-doing. Speciﬁcally, human capital in the next period depends on its current level and the
current labor employment in learning industries, and the state equation for human capital is
5It may be considered that each industry has bounded learning, introduced by Young (1993), requiring that
no knowledge can be gained by learning in highly matured industries.
6We consider a discrete-time model, instead of a continuous-time model. A unit of time should be introduced
in order to capture clearly the situation in which a style change in market demands has the negative eﬀect on the
production ﬂexibility, explained carefully in the later part.
5given as:
Ht+1 = h(LA,t,Ht), (1)
where LA,t is the labor employment in learning industries at period t, and h(·,·) is the learning
function with h(·,·) > 0, hL > 0, hH > 0 and limH→1− h(·,H) = 1. These conditions ensure that
human capital is bounded and rises toward its asymptotic limit of unity, and that its increment
is increasing in LA,t. This speciﬁcation captures the situation in which the dynamic learning
externalities emphasized in the Kemp criterion become larger with an increase in LA,t and are
diminishing over time. Figure 1 illustrates these properties when LA,t is ﬁxed at a certain level,
L1 and L2 with L1 > L2, in any period.
Taking human capital Ht as given, xz,t, the output of commodity z in period t, is compet-
itively produced using labor lz,t and its commodity-speciﬁc factor az,t under a constant-returns
technology, as in the framework of the Ricardo-Viner model. Labor can move freely among
industries, while the commodity-speciﬁc factors cannot. Output of commodity z is given as:
xz,t = F(lz,t,az,t|Ht,z,t) ≡ z,tHtf(lz,t,az,t), (2)
where the output-augmenting eﬃciency index has two components, an economy-wide component
Ht and an industry-speciﬁc productivity index z,t ∈ (0,1]. We assume for simplicity that for
all z, there is the same function f, which is strictly increasing in both arguments, exhibiting
constant-returns. Learning eﬀect, which forms human capital Ht, is entirely an economy-wide
phenomenon, completely external to ﬁrms so that perfect competition continues to prevail.
In this model, the central assumption to capture the variability market demand is that each
commodity z ∈ [0,1] is ‘stylish’ in the following sense. There are two alternative styles. In
every period only one style is demanded in each industry, and output is worthless unless it is
in accordance with the style ‘a la mode’. Nature may decide to have a style change at a given
probability θz ∈ (0,1]. θz is the parameter for the frequency of demand shock. It captures the
degree of demand variability for commodity z. The style is more variable with an increase in θz.
6We suppose that the degree of demand variability is identical for all industries, i.e., θz = θ ∈ (0,1]





1 if the style of commodity z changes from period t − 1 to period t
0 otherwise.
Then, P[∆z,t = 1] = θ and P[∆z,t = 0] = 1 − θ. Since style change is costly, we assume that for





1 if ∆z,t = 0
1 − ¯ ηz,t ∈ (0,1] if ∆z,t = 1,
where ¯ ηz,t ∈ [0,1) is the proportional loss in the industry-speciﬁc productivity due to style change.
3.2 Government Activities
The government always keeps a balanced budget. It has two policy tools: ﬁrst, promotion support
for learning industries as government support, and second, elaborate monitoring as bureaucratic
control. For promotion support, the government imposes a tax on all industries equally to raise
a revenue of amount τ > 0 and grants equal support for sales promotion to eligible industries
with an administrative cost c ∈ (0,τ).8 Eligibility is given to all approved producers who have
applied for the support. Due to asymmetric information between the government and applicants,
some non-learning industries may win government approval in rent-seeking. To counter this,
the government may install bureaucratic procedures for elaborate monitoring. For simplicity,
we assume that the procedure is costless in resources except that the bureaucratic process is
detrimental to the ability of ﬁrms’ response to demand variability.
Let (St,Mt) denote the government action in period t consisting of the two binary choices of
7Assume that ∆z,t is independent of z and t. The model is based on a special case of Markovian process.
Although we can use a generalized Makovian process, the model would be much complicated.
8The parameter c can be considered as the cost of tax collection fee. This cost may be realistically a signiﬁcant
factor.











1 elaborate monitoring is adopted
0 otherwise,
and St and Mt are called the support action and the monitoring action, respectively.
3.2.1 Eligibility of Promotion Support
Elaborate monitoring (Mt = 1) enables the government to limit approval to ﬁrms only in learning
industries. In the absence of such monitoring (Mt = 0), the government cannot exclude some part
of rent-seeking ﬁrms in non-learning industries from sharing support. Let (K,K(1 + λ)] denote
the set of non-learning industries that obtain government support under elaborate monitoring.
The parameter λ ∈ [0,1/K − 1) captures the degree of rent-seeking activities in non-learning
industries under elaborate monitoring. Promotion support for learning industries is more diluted
into non-learning industries with an increase in the degree of rent-seeking activities λ. Then,
given monitoring action Mt, the set of eligible industries D(Mt) ⊂ [0,1] is represented as
D(Mt) = [0,K + λK(1 − Mt)].
3.2.2 Eﬀect of Government Action on Industry-Speciﬁc Factor
The objective of promotion support is to increase labor productivity in eligible industries D(Mt).
To capture this, we suppose that promotion support leads to net monetary transfer over all
industries and inﬂuences the resources available to various ﬁrms in the form of the supply of the
9For my objective to clarify endogenous policy transition, I assume that in each of the two policies the
government can make only a binary choice.
8industry-speciﬁc factor according to the following formula.10




a0 + St[δ(Mt) − τ] if z ∈ D(Mt)
a0 − Stτ if z ∈ [0,1] \ D(Mt),
(3)
where a0 > 0 is the industry-speciﬁc factor in each industry without promotion support, and
τ is the tax imposed on each industry.11 They are assumed to be identical for all industries.
δ(Mt) > 0 is the after-tax contribution to the industry-speciﬁc factor in each eligible industry
by such a transfer under promotion support.
Because of a balanced budget of the government in every period, the total tax revenue minus
the administrative cost of promotion support, τ − c, must equal the budget size of promotion
support. Since the industry-speciﬁc factor in eligible industry z ∈ D(Mt) increases by δ(Mt)




if Mt = 1; δ(Mt) =
τ − c
K(1 + λ)
if Mt = 0. (4)
Remark 1 The industry-speciﬁc factor in eligible industries increases by receiving promotion
support, while that in non-eligible industries decreases by taxation. Moreover, there exists policy
dilution due to asymmetric information without elaborate monitoring. Non-elaborate monitoring
dilutes promotion support into part of non-learning industries that are undeserved for government
assistance by spreading out the extent of eligible industries (D(1) = [0,K] ⊂ [0,K(1 + λ)] =
D(0)). At the same time, it reduces the eﬀect of promotion support on the industry-speciﬁc
factor for all eligible industries (δ(1) = τ−c
K > τ−c
K(1+λ) = δ(0)). Even though the production
in non-learning industries z ∈ (K,K(1 + λ)] seems like the ones in learning industries, these
10Although an industrial policy is usually complicated and its form is thus diﬃcult to describe brieﬂy, its
primary objective can be said to increase labor productivity so as to promote the targeted industry. This is
commonly accomplished in part by such instruments as taxes, exchange rates, rationing and subsidies. Many
countries have come to employ a wider range of instruments, including support programs for sector-speciﬁc R&D
and the provision of information. For example, the Japanese government initiated the Very Large Scale Integrate
(VLSI) Semiconductor Project to foster the semiconductor industry in front of the threat by IBM (Imai (1984)).
Also, exhibitions such as electronic-show, which are partly supported by public sector, play an important role in
providing industry-speciﬁc information.
11For simplicity, we assume that τ is optimally derived from some institutional reasons.
9productions contribute nothing to human capital accumulation. Figure 2 shows the relationship
between the government action (St,Mt) and the industry-speciﬁc factor az,t.
3.2.3 Eﬀect of Government Action on Industry-Speciﬁc Productivity Index
Although elaborate monitoring prevents some ﬁrms from perverting promotion support, it does
not come free in that too much red tape hurts production ﬂexibility in response to a style change.
Demand changes in eligible industries are more costly under elaborate monitoring than under
non-elaborate monitoring.12 To clarify this, we suppose that under elaborate monitoring, only
eligible ﬁrms would apply for support. Only those who are applying for support would lose
ﬂexibility due to elaborate monitoring. The lack of ﬂexibility matters only if there is a style
change. Speciﬁcally, when style of commodity z ∈ [0,K] in learning industries changes under
elaborate monitoring (∆z,t = 1 and Mt = 1), there is a loss in the industry-speciﬁc productivity
index, ¯ ηz,t = η ∈ (0,1). The eﬀect of elaborate monitoring is identical for all learning industries.
For given government action (St,Mt) and the realization of style change ∆z,t, the industry-speciﬁc
productivity index is given as:13




1 − ηStMt∆z,t if z ∈ [0,K]
1 if z ∈ (K,1].
Without promotion support (St = 0), monitoring is pointless so that there will be no red tape
and no loss in the industry-speciﬁc productivity index, i.e., z,t = 1.
Remark 2 Since the probability of style change is identical at θ for all industries, the expected
12As an example, we may consider the situation in which, under the red tape, output cannot be delivered ‘just
in time’, by regular procedure so that overtime pay must be paid to workers to fulﬁll the order.
13To focus on the case in which elaborate monitoring induces red tape, suppose that the industry-speciﬁc
productivity index never changes at ¯ ηz,t = 0 for any non-learning industry z ∈ (K,1] under elaborate monitoring
(Mt = 1) even when its style changes. Without such monitoring (Mt = 0), the index never changes at ¯ ηz,t = 0
for all industries z ∈ [0,1] irrespective of whether to have a style change.
10industry-speciﬁc productivity index is given as:




1 − θηStMt if z ∈ [0,K]
1 if z ∈ (K,1].
(5)
The value of θη represents the expected negative eﬀect in learning industries through red tape.
Figure 3 shows the eﬀect of government action on the expected productivity index E(z,t).
3.3 Government’s Dynamic Problem
The government maximizes the expected sum of national income over time with discount rate
β ∈ (0,1).14 To analyze an optimal policy, we consider the following steps in each period t:
Step 1 Given human capital Ht, the government chooses its action (St,Mt) ∈ {0,1}2. The
decision determines the industry-speciﬁc factor az,t ≡ az(St,Mt) and the expected industry-
speciﬁc productivity index E(z,t) ≡ E(z(St,Mt,∆z,t)) in each industry z. The government
has no information about the style of commodity z ∈ [0,1] in that period, except the
probability θ of style change.
Step 2 The equilibrium labor employment l∗
z,t ≡ lz(Ht,St,Mt) in each industry z is determined










and the next period’s human capital Ht+1 = h(L∗
A(Ht,St,Mt),Ht).
Step 3 Nature decides whether or not there will be a style change (∆z,t), which in turn deter-
mines the industry-speciﬁc productivity index z,t ≡ z(St,Mt,∆z,t). Using the already de-
14Assume that the government is risk-neutral.
15Note that competitive ﬁrms must choose labor employment facing uncertainty related to a style change in
the current period. The actual proﬁt for ﬁrms depends on the realization about a style change. We assume that
the industry-speciﬁc factor is owned by ﬁrms so that its rent is included in the proﬁt. If the negative eﬀect of a
style change on the proﬁt is small enough, each existing ﬁrm never goes bankruptcy because of its positive proﬁt.
11cided labor employment l∗
z,t and the industry-speciﬁc factor az,t with the output-augmenting













Step 4 The ﬁrst stage in period t + 1 starts.































subject to Ht+1 = h(L∗
A(Ht,St,Mt),Ht) and H0 ∈ (0,1) as given. We denote by v(H0) the value
function of this problem.
4 Analysis
This section ﬁrst introduces some assumptions. After that, we derive a temporal market equi-
librium, taking human capital Ht and government action (St,Mt) as given. Then, an optimal
policy is sketched out in the framework of a dynamic programming. Finally, we discuss some
economic implications that are indicated by our results.
4.1 Assumptions
Reallocation of the industry-speciﬁc factor over all industries may inﬂuence current national
income. Thus, the government may have an incentive to reallocate by adopting promotion
support for reasons diﬀerent from dynamic learning eﬀect. In order to focus on learning, we
12wish to neutralize the eﬀect of the reallocation of the industry-speciﬁc factor on current national
income.16 Therefore, we assume that all industries share identical linear homogeneous production
technology except the industry-speciﬁc productivity index.17 To make the model tractable, the
following assumption is made.
Assumption 1 The production technology for each commodity is described as the Cobb-Douglas




z,t with µ ∈ (0,1).18
Remark 3 This assumption requires that promotion support with the administrative cost of
promotion support must reduce current national income irrespective of the allocation, and the
government has no incentive to reallocate the industry-speciﬁc factors without dynamic learning
eﬀect.
The next assumption is related to the state equation for human capital.
Assumption 2 h(LA,t,Ht) = 1−[1−ν(LA,t)](1−Ht) with ν(L) ∈ (0,1) and ν0(L) > 0 for any
L ≥ 0.
The state equation (1) for H is rewritten as:
1 − Ht+1
1 − Ht
= 1 − ν(LA,t).
The value of ν represents the speed of technological progress. The condition of ν0 > 0 requires
that the total labor employment in learning industries contributes to the acceleration of human
capital.
16The neutralization here means that current national income is independent of the allocation of the industry-
speciﬁc factor.
17To see this, suppose that the industry-speciﬁc factor and the price of output are identical for all industries. We
also suppose that only the government can reallocate the industry-speciﬁc factor az over two industries z ∈ {1,2}
without cost. We furthermore suppose that the sum of the industry-speciﬁc factors in the two industries is ﬁxed at
a = a1+a2, that the total labor input is ﬁxed at ¯ L = l1+l2, and that the production technology for each industry




i . Then, it is easy to ﬁnd that national income is ¯ Lµa1−µ, independent of the
allocation of the industry-speciﬁc factors. Thus, Under the assumption of the linear homogeneous technology
without dynamic learning eﬀect in learning industries, if there is an administrative cost of the reallocation, the
government has no incentive to reallocate the industry-speciﬁc factor.
18The Cobb-Douglas function f(l,a) = lµa1−µ is linear homogeneous. The linear homogeneous function is
always homothetic.
13Remark 4 Given H0 and {LA,l}
t−1
l=0, human capital in period t can be represented as
Ht = 1 − (1 − H0)
t−1 Y
s=0
[1 − ν(LA,s)], (9)
which implies that human capital is strictly increasing over time and its asymptotic limit is unity
as t goes to inﬁnity since ν(LA,s) ∈ (0,1).
4.2 Temporal Equilibrium
A temporal market equilibrium in period t is determined taking human capital Ht and government
action (St,Mt) as given. When labor allocation is determined under perfect competition, ﬁrms
have no information about the realization of a style change and act as expected proﬁt maximizers
so that the wage rate wt equals the expected marginal value of product with respect to labor.
By equation (2), the equilibrium outcome in any period t must satisfy:
E(z,t)Htfl(lz,t,az,t) = wt, (10)
for any z ∈ [0,1], with the labor market clearing condition:
Z 1
0
lz,tdz = ¯ L. (11)
Government action (St,Mt) may aﬀect the equilibrium by changing the industry-speciﬁc factor
az,t and the expected industry-speciﬁc productivity index E(z,t).
There are three possible actions to be taken place by the government in each period; [action
I] laissez faire, [action II] promotion support without elaborate monitoring, and [action III]
promotion support with elaborate monitoring.19 Let G ≡ {G1,G2,G3} denote the set of all
possible government actions, where G1 ≡ (0,0), G2 ≡ (1,0) and G3 ≡ (1,1) represent actions
I, II, and III, respectively. The expected national income ge(Ht,St,Mt) and the total labor
employment in learning industries L∗
A(Ht,St,Mt) in the equilibrium are two important values
19The possibility of elaborate monitoring with promotion support can be excluded since there is no objective
for monitoring without promotion support (any ﬁrm does not apply for support).
14for policy makers to maximize the sum of the expected national income over time. The latter is
related to future national income since it is the only source to accumulate human capital from
the current period to the next through the state equation. By equations (3), (4), (5), (10) and
(11), the following result in the equilibrium is obtained.
Lemma 1 For each Gt = (St,Mt) ∈ G, the total labor employment in learning industries and
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K¯ L if (St,Mt) = (0,0)
a0−τ+(τ−c)/[K(1+λ)]
a0−c K¯ L if (St,Mt) = (1,0)
(1−θη)1/(1−µ)(a0−τ+(τ−c)/K)







      
      
Ht¯ Lµa
1−µ
0 if (St,Mt) = (0,0)
Ht¯ Lµ(a0 − c)1−µ if (St,Mt) = (1,0)
Ht¯ LµB1−µ if (St,Mt) = (1,1),
(13)
respectively, where B ≡ [K(1 − θη)1/(1−µ) + 1 − K](a0 − τ) + K(1 − θη)1/(1−µ)(τ − c).
Notice that L∗
A,t(Ht,1,0) depends on λ, and L∗
A,t(Ht,1,1) and ge
t(Ht,1,1) depend on θ. By
equations (12) and (13), we obtain the following result.
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On the other hand, a rise in demand variability reduces dynamic learning eﬀect as well as the
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where A = (1 − θη)1/(1−µ).
Remark 5 By equations (12) and (13), for any government action Gt ≡ (St,Mt) ∈ G, the equi-
librium labor employment L∗
A,t in learning industries is independent of human capital Ht ∈ (0,1),
and the equilibrium expected national income ge
t is proportional to human capital Ht. These are
due to the speciﬁcation in which the production technology has the output-augmenting eﬃciency
index, z,tHt. Then, the equilibrium labor employment can be rewritten as L∗
A(St,Mt) = L∗
A(Gt)
with the element Ht dropped out, and also the expected national income can be rewritten as
ge
t(Ht,St,Mt) = HtR(St,Mt) = HtR(Gt), where R(·) is the expected national income per unit of
human capital and is independent of Ht.
4.3 Comparison among Actions I, II and III
This subsection examines the results of actions I, II and III (G1, G2 and G3). Promotion support
reallocates the industry-speciﬁc factors over all industries with the administrative cost c. This
paper focuses on two issues: ﬁrst, the rent-seeking issue in which rent-seekers in non-learning
industries receive government assistance under non-elaborate monitoring, and second, the ﬂex-
ibility issue in which demand variability reduces ﬂexibility under elaborate monitoring. The
rent-seeking issue is more signiﬁcant with larger degree of rent-seeking activities, λ, while the
ﬂexibility issue is more signiﬁcant with larger demand variability, θ. By equations (12) and (13),
the following results are obtained.
Lemma 2 R(G1) > R(G2) > R(G3) and L∗
A(G1) < L∗
A(G2).
Remark 6 A laissez faire policy always attains the highest expected national income (R(G1) >
max{R(G2),R(G3)}). This is because the economy incurs administrative cost c > 0 under pro-
16motion support. Therefore, promotion support can never be justiﬁed without dynamic learning
eﬀect. Moreover, under promotion support, elaborate monitoring always attains smaller expected
national income than non-elaborate monitoring (R(G2) > R(G3)) since elaborate monitoring in-
duces the loss in the expected industry-speciﬁc productivity index that reduces the expected
national income.
Remark 7 Promotion support without elaborate monitoring causes learning industries to face a
higher labor productivity and select a higher employment than a laissez faire policy, in spite that
some rent-seekers in non-learning industries reduce the eﬀectiveness of the support (L∗
A(G1) <
L∗
A(G2)). On the other hand, promotion support with elaborate monitoring yields a higher
industry-speciﬁc factor than without such monitoring. But at the same time it also reduces
the expected industry-speciﬁc productivity index in learning industries. An increase in the
industry-speciﬁc factor induces a higher labor productivity, but a decrease in the industry-speciﬁc
productivity index induces a lower labor productivity. The industry-speciﬁc factor under non-
elaborate monitoring depends on the degree of rent-seeking activity, λ, and the expected industry-
speciﬁc productivity index under elaborate monitoring depends on demand variability, θ. Thus,
the two parameters, λ and θ, are crucial to determine which monitoring scheme induces a higher
labor productivity and a higher employment in learning industries.
The following result is related to the total labor employment under G2 and G3.
Lemma 3 For any λ ∈ (0,1/K−1), there exists a unique value ψ(λ) ∈ (0,1] such that L∗
A(G2) <
L∗
A(G3) for any θ ∈ (0,ψ(λ)) and L∗
A(G2) > L∗
A(G3) for any θ ∈ (ψ(λ),1]. Furthermore, the
critical value ψ(λ) is increasing in λ if ψ(λ) < 1.
Remark 8 Promotion support induces larger learning eﬀect under elaborate monitoring if the
rent-seeking issue is relatively signiﬁcant, i.e., λ is relatively large compared to θ. In contrast, it
induces larger learning eﬀect under non-elaborate monitoring if the ﬂexibility issue is relatively
signiﬁcant, i.e., θ is relatively large compared to λ.
Lemmas 2 and 3 show the trade-oﬀ relation in the sense that promotion support reduces
the attainable welfare in the current period, but it may increase future welfare by speeding up
17human capital accumulation. Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between L∗
A(G2) and L∗
A(G3)
for each pair of λ and θ. The critical value θ = ψ(λ) is represented by OLM. Any pair (λ,θ) in
area OLMN yields L∗
A(G2) < L∗
A(G3), while any pair in area OPL yields L∗
A(G2) > L∗
A(G3).
4.4 Dynamic Decision Problem
This subsection examines government’s dynamic decision problem (8), in which the government
has a trinary choice in each period.21 Promotion support may make an economy enjoy larger
dynamic learning eﬀect through an increase in labor employment in learning industries. Since
learning eﬀect is diminishing over time, so is the beneﬁt of promotion support. However, at the
same time, promotion support incurs an administrative cost. The nature of the cost does not
depend on time and learning potentials. Thus, the balance between the need for learning eﬀect
and the desirability for laissez faire changes endogenously.
Elaborate monitoring also has its beneﬁt and cost under promotion support. The beneﬁt
comes from the preclusion of rent-seeking activities. Since such activities reduce the progress of
human capital accumulation, and since human capital approaches to its upper bound (diminishing
learning potentials over time), the beneﬁt diminishes over time. In contrast, the cost is from
the loss in ﬂexibility. The nature of the cost does not depend on time and learning potentials
since the loss of ﬂexibility reduces the productivity all the time. Thus, the balance between
the need for the preclusion of rent-seeking activities and the desirability for ﬂexibility changes
endogenously.
The optimal government action in period t depends only on Ht, and G(H) denotes the
function mapping the state variable H ∈ (0,1) into the optimal government action in G.22 There
are two cases according to the result in Lemma 3. The ﬁrst case, say case A, is the one with
θ ∈ (ψ(λ),1] corresponding to area OLP in Figure 4. The second case, say case B, is the one
21The state variable H is independent of the realization of style change and this problem has the Markov
property. This property is due to the speciﬁcation in which in each period the total labor inputs in learning
industries is determined before Nature decides whether or not to change style, i.e., each competitive ﬁrm commits
to use some labor inputs before the realization of style uncertainty, and hence next period’s level of human capital
is also independent of the realization (even though being dependent on probability θ of style change).
22The dynamic problem is autonomous since its dependence on time is merely through the discount term, which
is assumed to be constant at β ∈ (0,1).
18with θ ∈ [0,ψ(λ)) corresponding to area OLMN in Figure 4. On the (ν,R) plane in Figures 5,




A(G3)),R(G3)), respectively. Lemma 3 requires that point C is within area OBEF if
θ ∈ (ψ(λ),1], while point C is within area EFHG if θ ∈ [0,ψ(λ)).
We further divide case B into two subcases according to the following way. On the (ν,R)
plane in Figures 6 and 7 (the upper part), we divide area EFHG into two subareas according
to the line that passes through both points A and E. The ﬁrst is subcase B-I in which point
C is within area EIG above line AI, and the second is subcase B-II in which point C is within
area EFHI below line AI. Figures 6 and 7 illustrates subcases B-I and B-II, respectively. Then,
regarding the relationship between each of the two subcases and the values of (θ,λ), the following
preliminary result is obtained.
Lemma 4 Consider line AI in Figures 5, 6 and 7. For any λ ∈ (0,1/K − 1), there exists a
unique value ϕ(λ) ∈ (0,ψ(λ)] such that (ν(L∗
A(G3)),R(G3)) is above line AI for any θ ∈ (0,ϕ(λ)),
and (ν(L∗
A(G3)),R(G3)) is below line AI for any θ ∈ (ϕ(λ),ψ(λ)). And also, the critical value
ϕ(λ) is increasing in λ.
Remark 9 Using Lemmas 3 and 4, for any λ ∈ (0,1/K−1), the range (0,1] of demand variability
θ is divided into three subranges; (0,ϕ(λ)), (ϕ(λ),ψ(λ)) and (ψ(λ),1], which correspond to
subcase B-I, subcase B-II and case A, respectively. Case A corresponds to the situation in which
the ﬂexibility issue is more signiﬁcant. Subcase B-I corresponds to the situation in which the
rent-seeking issue is relatively signiﬁcant compared to the ﬂexibility issue. Subcase B-II shows
the intermediate situation between case A and subcase B-I (see Figure 4).23
23Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 illustrate these three categories for the better understanding. Dotted curve OT in Figure
4 represents the function θ = ϕ(λ) that is monotonically increasing in λ and divides area B into area B-I and
area B-II. Curve OLM represents the function θ = ψ(λ) that is also monotonically increasing in λ and divides the
whole area into area B and area A. Figure 5, as explained before, shows case A that corresponds area A in Figure
4. In contrast, Figure 6 shows subcase B-I that corresponds to area B-I in Figure 4, and the result of action III
(point C) is inside area EIG. Finally, Figure 7 indicates subcase B-II that corresponds to area B-II in Figure 4,
and the result of action III (point C) is inside EFHI.
194.4.1 Main Results
We now show the main results in each of the three cases, case A, subcases B-I and B-II. Let
mi = [1 − β(1 − ν(L∗
A(Gi)))]/[1 − β(1 − ν(L∗
A(G1)))] > 1 and ri = R(G1)/R(Gi) > 1 for each
i ∈ {2,3}.
Case A : The Flexibility Issue is Relatively Signiﬁcant
Proposition 1 Suppose that the ﬂexibility issue is relatively signiﬁcant such that θ ∈ (ψ(λ),1].
(1) The adoption of promotion support without elaborate monitoring is optimal for H ∈ (0, ˆ H),
and a laissez faire policy is optimal for H ∈ ( ˆ H,1), where




(2) The critical value ˆ H is decreasing in λ.
Remark 10 (Policy Liberalization) Since human capital converges to its upper-bound, the
eﬀect of promotion support on learning eﬀect is diminishing over time.24 This implies that the
merit of promotion support is diminishing over time with the nature of its cost unchanged. Thus,
promotion support becomes less attractive over time. If the initial level of human capital is less
than ˆ H, then the government should adopt the policy reform from the promotion support regime
to the laissez faire regime. That is, the optimal policy calls for endogenous liberalization in some
future period (see Figure 5 (the lower part)).
Remark 11 (Bureaucracy) Elaborate monitoring has large negative impact on the industry-
speciﬁc productivity index. Since the ﬂexibility issue is relatively more signiﬁcant compared to
the rent-seeking issue, the cost of elaborate monitoring is relatively high compared to its beneﬁt.
Thus, elaborate monitoring cannot be justiﬁed.
24Proposition 1 partially comes from the result that our original dynamic problem can be reducible to an
optimal stopping problem in which the government decides the timing of changing from action II to action I if the
initial level of human capital is small enough so that action II is optimal in the initial period. For the discussion
of an optimal stopping problem, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
20Remark 12 (Comparative Statics) A rise in the degree of rent-seeking activities makes pro-
motion support less eﬀective. In this case, the reform to a laissez faire policy should be imple-
mented at an earlier stage of human capital accumulation.
Subcase B-I : The Rent-Seeking Issue is Relatively Signiﬁcant
Proposition 2 Suppose that the rent-seeking issue is relatively signiﬁcant such that θ ∈ (0,ϕ(λ)).
(1) The adoption of promotion support with elaborate monitoring is optimal for H ∈ (0, ˜ H), and
a laissez faire policy is optimal for H ∈ ( ˜ H,1), where




(2) The critical value ˜ H is decreasing in θ.
Remark 13 (Policy Liberalization) As in case A, the result is also due to the property
of diminishing learning eﬀect. If the initial level of human capital is less than ˜ H, then the
government should adopt the policy reform from the promotion support regime to the laissez faire
regime in some future period, i.e., the optimal policy calls for endogenous policy liberalization
(see Figure 6 (the lower part)).
Remark 14 (Bureaucracy) In contrast to case A, elaborate monitoring should be accompa-
nied with promotion support in the early stage. Although elaborate monitoring reduces ﬂexibility,
it makes promotion support signiﬁcantly more eﬀective by avoiding serious rent-seeking. The
beneﬁt of elaborate monitoring is relatively high compared to its cost.
Remark 15 (Comparative Statics) The policy reform to a laissez faire policy should be
implemented at an earlier stage of human capital accumulation as demand variability becomes
larger. The increase in demand variability θ reduces the speed of human capital accumulation
as well as the expected national income, making a laissez faire policy become more attractive.
21Subcase B-II : Intermediate Case Subcase B-II corresponds to the case in which (θ,λ) is
in the intermediate case between subcase B-I and case A. Then the following preliminary result
is obtained.
Lemma 5 Suppose that θ ∈ (ϕ(λ),ψ(λ)). Let ˆ H = 1 − (r2 − 1)/(r2m2 − 1). Then,
(1) G(H) = G1 = (0,0) for any H ∈ ( ˆ H,1);
(2) there exists some ε ∈ (0, ˆ H) such that G(H) = G2 = (1,0) for any H ∈ ( ˆ H − ε, ˆ H);
(3) there exists some ξ ∈ (0, ˆ H) such that G(H) = G3 = (1,1) for any H ∈ (0,ξ).
Remark 16 The ﬁrst part of this result states that a laissez faire policy is optimal at a later
stage of human capital accumulation as in the previous cases. The second says that promotion
support without elaborate monitoring is optimal if human capital is less than, but close enough
to ˆ H. The third means that if human capital is small enough, promotion support with elaborate
monitoring is optimal.
Notice that in subcase B-II, the complete description of the optimal government action over
the domain of the state variable H may be complex. The assumption of θ ∈ (ϕ(λ),ψ(λ)) is
insuﬃcient to guarantee that there exist two critical values H1 and H2 such that G(H) = G3 for
H ∈ (0,H1), G(H) = G2 for H ∈ (H1,H2), and G(H) = G1 for H ∈ (H2,1).25 To understand
25There may be a case in which, focusing on the range (a,1) ⊂ (0,1) of H, action II is optimal for any H in its
lower range (a,a1), action III is optimal for any H in its middle range (a1,a2), action II is again optimal for any
H in its higher range (a2,a3), and action I is ﬁnally optimal for any H in its highest range (a3,1). To understand
this, consider a numerical example, where (R1,R2,R3) = (1.00,0.81,0.80) and (ν1,ν2,ν3) = (0.10,0.39,0.40)
with β = 0.95, where Ri ≡ R(Gi) and νi ≡ ν(L∗
A(Gi)) for i ∈ {1,2,3}. Let us restrict ourselves into the range
H ∈ (0.840,1.000). Then we can derive the optimal action: G(H) = G2 for H ∈ (0.840,0.850), G(H) = G3
for H ∈ (0.850,0.868), G(H) = G2 for H ∈ (0.868,0.909), and G(H) = G1 for H ∈ (0.909,1.000). In fact,
the optimal action may not change monotonically, as human capital H increases. It changes from G2 to G3 at
H1 = 0.850, from G3 to G2 again at H2 = 0.868, and from G2 to G1 at H3 = 0.909. This implies that there are
three critical values of H, at each of which the policy change should be considered, and that the range in which
G2 is optimal is divided into two regions, (0.840,0.850) and (0.868,0.909).
However, it does not mean that the optimal policy (sequence of actions) is G2 → G3 → G2 → G1. Deﬁne
by G(H) the function mapping the state variable H ∈ (0,1) into the optimal sequence of government actions
from that period. The function G : (0,1) → G ≡ {G1,G2,G3} is a function mapping the state variable H
into the optimal government action at that period, while the function G : (0,1) → Gχ0 mapping the state
variable H ∈ (0,1) into the optimal inﬁnite sequence of government actions from that period, where Gχ0 is
the policy space consisting of countably inﬁnite sequence of elements in G. In this example, the optimal policy
sequence is G(H) = {2(2),1(∞)} for any H ∈ (0.840,0.850), G(H) = {3(1),1(∞)} for any H ∈ (0.850,0.868),
G(H) = {2(1),1(∞)} for any H ∈ (0.868,0.909), and G(H) = {1(∞)} for any H ∈ (0.909,1.000), where i(l) is the
ﬁnite sequence {Gi,··· ,Gi} with l elements, and 1(∞) is the inﬁnite sequence {G1,G1,···}. {3(m),2(n),1(∞)}
means that the government adopts G3 m times (periods), G2 n times (periods) and then G1 forever. This implies
that if the initial human capital is between 0.840 and 0.850, then the path of human capital under the optimal
action skips over the range (0.850,0.868), where G3 is optimal.
22subcase B-II more, we consider an optimal sequence of government actions. Let
H
0 = 1 −
(1 − β)[R(G2) − R(G3)]
[1 − β(1 − ν(L∗
A(G3))]R(G2) − [1 − β(1 − ν(L∗
A(G2))]R(G3)
.
Then, the following preliminary result is obtained.
Lemma 6 Suppose that θ ∈ (ϕ(λ),ψ(λ)) and ¯ H < H0. For any H ∈ (0,1), neither G2 nor G3
follows G1, and G3 never follows G2 in the optimal sequence of government actions.
Remark 17 Once a laissez faire policy is optimal in some period, promotion support cannot
be optimal in any future period irrespective of monitoring action. Moreover, once promotion
support without elaborate monitoring is optimal, elaborate monitoring cannot be justiﬁed in
any future period.
By Lemmas 5 and 6, the following main result in subcase B-II is obtained.
Proposition 3 Suppose that θ ∈ (ϕ(λ),ψ(λ)) and ¯ H < H0. Suppose also that the adoption of
promotion support with elaborate monitoring is optimal for a given initial human capital H ∈
(0,1). Then, at most two policy reforms should be adopted in some future periods, i.e., G3 → G1
or G3 → G2 → G1, where Gi → Gj represents the policy reform from Gi to Gj.
Remark 18 (Two Policy Reforms) In contrast to the previous cases, case A and subcase B-I,
where one endogenous policy reform should be implemented, the important point here is that
under some conditions, there may be two endogenous policy reforms, G3 → G2 → G1. Figure 7
(the lower part) illustrates a case in which the policy reform should be implemented in periods
T ∗ and T ∗∗.
Remark 19 The balance between the beneﬁt and the cost of monitoring changes endogenously
over time. In this case, the beneﬁt dominates the cost in the early stage when learning potentials
are large, while the cost dominates the beneﬁt in the later stage when learning potentials get
small.26 That is, the rent-seeking issue is signiﬁcant in the early stage, while the ﬂexibility issue is
26Case A corresponds to a situation in which the cost always dominates the beneﬁt until the period when
promotion support cannot be justiﬁed. Conversely, subcase B-I corresponds to a situation in which the beneﬁt
always dominates the cost until the period when promotion support cannot be justiﬁed.
23signiﬁcant in the later stage. Noticing that ultimately promotion support cannot be justiﬁed, the
policy makers should adopt two endogenous policy reforms; the ﬁrst is the administrative reform
from elaborate monitoring to non-elaborate monitoring with learning industries continuously
supported, and the second is the reform to a laissez faire policy.
Remark 20 (Numerical Example)
Consider an example in which ¯ L = 1, a0 = 1, K = 0.2, ¯ δ = 0.25, η = 0.1, µ = 0.5, τ = 0.1,
λ = 0.3, θ = 0.25 and ν(L) = L. The expected national income per unit of human capital and the
speed of human capital accumulation under government actions, G1, G2 and G3, are represented
as (R(G1),ν(L∗
A(G1)) = (1,0.2), (R(G2),ν(L∗
A(G2)) = (0.9747,0.23), and (R(G3),ν(L∗
A(G3)) =
(0.9688,0.2329), respectively. It is easy to show that this is the case of θ ∈ (ϕ(λ),ψ(λ)), i.e.,
subcase B-II. Suppose that the initial human capital is H0 = 0.1. Using Lemmas 5 and 6, the
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inﬁnitely many periods
},
which implies that there are two endogenous policy reforms.
Finally we deduce the following result that is satisﬁed in all cases, case A, subcase B-I and
subcase B-II.
Corollary 2 Let ˇ H ≡ max{ ˆ H, ˜ H}, where ˆ H = 1 − (r2 − 1)/(r2m2 − 1) and ˜ H = 1 − (r3 −
1)/(r3m3 −1). Then, initially the adoption of promotion support is optimal for any H ∈ (0, ˇ H),
and ultimately the laissez faire regime is optimal for any H ∈ ( ˇ H,1).
4.5 Discussions
4.5.1 Policy Reform from Industrial Policies to Laissez Faire
In the development process of many countries (especially those in Asia), there is a continuous
sequence of policy reforms, leading from the implementation of industrial policies to the grad-
ual adoption of laissez faire. At the same time, there have been on-going debates about the
24eﬀectiveness of industrial policies. Taking Japan for example, Miwa (2004) states that targeted
industrial policies constitute unfair government intervention and play little role in development.
In their view, an industrial policy represents past errors and liberalizing reform is its subsequent
correction. In contrast, researchers like Amsden (2001) regards the protection of infant industries
as necessary. Others like Itoh, Kiyono, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Suzumura (1991) maintain that al-
though past industrial policies may not be error-free, such policies as the adoption of temporary
protection to launch an industry can be helpful, at least in theory.
In order to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of industrial policies, an investigation of economic his-
tory is necessary. This study is not an investigation of history, but a theoretic inquiry. From
the theoretical point of view, our results agree with Itoh, Kiyono, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Suzu-
mura (1991) in that temporary industrial policies may be valuable. But more than that, the
development process, viewed as an episode of ‘catching-up’ in ‘late-industrialization,’ calls for an
endogenous sequence of policy reforms, with justiﬁed government participation in early stages
and continued liberalization toward laissez faire. Therefore, it is not a case of present wisdom
correcting past errors. Balancing the beneﬁt and the cost of industrial policies, reforms also have
their optimal timing.
4.5.2 Cost and Beneﬁt of Bureaucracy
At a more speciﬁc level, it is well recognized that industrial policies may nurture knowledge
capital and overcome coordination failures. But there is inherent cost due to the distortion that
industrial policies induce. What has not been examined analytically in the past literature is
that these bureaucratic practices accompanying industrial policies would incur the cost of losing
production ﬂexibility as a result. This is studied in our inquiry. In cases, A, B-I and B-II, we
have highlighted the balance of cost and beneﬁt related to industrial policies and bureaucratic
procedures.
There has been a lot of studies that emphasize the signiﬁcance of production ﬂexibility for
achieving success across a wide rage of industries, especially quality- and fashion-sensitive in-
dustries (see, e.g., Deyo and Doner (2001), Appelbaum and Smith (2001), and Dicken (1992)).
25In particular, globalization may intensify the sensitivity since international markets are char-
acterized by ruthless competition and ongoing innovation. In such a situation, the ﬂexibility
issue is signiﬁcant. The cost of monitoring may be large so that elaborate monitoring cannot be
justiﬁed, as in case A. This ﬁnding has important policy implication since practicing elaborate
monitoring could be problematical in the case that the market of a targeted industry is highly
variable (e.g., machine tool industry and electronic industry). It may be considered that the lack
of competitiveness of Indian exports in pre-reform India can be attributed to strict regulatory
controls under frequent market shifts in the international market.
On the other hand, the rent-seeking issue may depend partially on state governance. If state
governance is not mature, as in some developing countries, it is much more diﬃcult to prevent
undeserved ﬁrms from obtaining government assistance. Since the assistance is not uniform for all
industries under a targeted industrial policy, there is doubt about the appropriate classiﬁcation
for a good. In this situation, it may be easy for ﬁrms in non-targeted industries to make it
appear to ﬁt into a targeted category. Thus, the rent-seeking issue is signiﬁcant, and the beneﬁt
of elaborate monitoring is large. Although seemingly ineﬃcient, complex bureaucratic procedures
might be necessary to make industrial policies eﬀective, as in subcase B-I.
The model also implied that administrative reform is not necessarily a correction of past
errors, but may be an optimal action of reﬂecting to the change in circumstance. The desirability
for ﬂexibility becomes more crucial compared to the need for the preclusion of rent-seeking
activities over time. In subcase B-II, which is the case between the previous two cases, the policy
makers seek to reduce in complexity of bureaucratic procedure before an ultimate transition to
laissez faire. This may be consistent with the fact that in many countries, administrative reforms
to simplify bureaucratic procedures have become the slogans of the day even though industry
targeting still holds.
5 Conclusion
Targeted industrial policies are usually accompanied with some bureaucratic controls, which
often bring about bureaucratic red tape. This paper focused on bureaucratic monitoring as the
26controls to prevent sub-optimal rent-seeking activities. A key problem of bureaucratic monitoring
is that it reduces production ﬂexibility in a globalized world with variable market demands. We
developed a dynamic model that explicitly includes the negative eﬀect of monitoring on ﬂexibility
and addressed policy transition to laissez faire.
In this paper the policy in each period consists of two components; (1) government support,
which promotes dynamic learning, and (2) a bureaucratic control, which constitutes monitoring.
The analysis calls for endogenous liberalization in the sense that a targeted industrial policy
should be implemented at an earlier stage of human capital accumulation, and then a laissez
faire policy should be adopted at a later stage. The result might be consistent with the empirical
evidence in Asian countries.
It was also shown that whether or not to couple elaborate monitoring with a targeted in-
dustrial policy at an earlier stage depends on the degrees of rent-seeking activities and demand
variability. When demand variability is relatively large, elaborate monitoring cannot be justi-
ﬁed contrary to the traditional protectionist’s stance. In contrast, when rent-seeking activities
prevail for some reasons, elaborate monitoring may induce higher welfare over time. The paper
also found it plausible that the government should adopt two endogenous policy transitions: the
ﬁrst is the administrative reform from elaborate monitoring into a simpliﬁed one, with learning
industries continuously supported, and the second is the reform to a laissez faire policy.
This paper tried to shed light into the motivation of a government to adopt bureaucratic
monitoring in the presence of industrial targeting. Hopefully this will help to interpret economic
history as well as to design government policies. As a ﬁnal remark, we have not studied the role
of innovation in the development process. This problem seems important since the aim of some
industrial policies may be to promote innovation by domestic ﬁrms. Although there are some
similarities between innovative process and learning process, it is important to understand the
diﬀerence: innovation of technologies is not the by-product of production experience. That topic
should be explained separately in the future.
276 Appendix
In this Appendix, we will ﬁrst explain the optimal control problem with a trinary choice, and
show an important result which we use in the proof of results in Section 4. After that, we will
show the proofs of all Lemmas and Propositions in Section 4.
6.1 Optimal Control Problem with Trinary Choice
6.1.1 Setup
Consider the situation in which there are three distinct actions, one of which must be chosen
in each period. Let G ≡ {G1,G2,G3} denote the set of all feasible actions in each period, and
let Gχ0 ≡ {G1,G2,G3}χ0 denote the set of all sequences whose element is in G. Let Ht ∈ (0,1)
denote the state variable in period t. The reward in period t, which depends on Ht and Gt ∈ G,
is represented as reward function HtR(Gt). The state variable in period t + 1 depends on Ht
and variable ν(L∗
A(Gt)) ∈ (0,1), which is determined by Gt, and the state equation for the state
variable is described by
Ht+1 = 1 − (1 − Ht)[1 − ν(L
∗
A(Gt))].








subject to the above state equation and H0 as given. For simplicity, for i ∈ {1,2,3}, let
Ri ≡ R(G
i), νi ≡ ν(L
∗
A(G
i)) and Mi ≡ 1 − νi,
and we assume that R1 > R2 > R3 and 1 > M1 > M2 > M3 as in case B in Section 4. We
denote by v(H) the value function of this problem.
6.1.2 Some Preliminaries
Let V (H,g) denote the value when action sequence g ∈ Gχ0 is chosen with H ∈ (0,1) as given.
We denote by {i(k)} the ﬁnite sequence {Gi,··· ,Gi}, the number elements is k. Then, we have
that, for m ∈ {1,2,···} and for i 6= j ∈ {2,3},
V (H;{1
(∞)}) = V (H;{2
(0),1














































































We ﬁrst deduce the following preliminary results regarding the function V :


























R1 − Ri > R1 − Ri > 0.
















Thus, for any m ∈ {0,1,2,...} and any i ∈ {2,3}, Claim 1 holds. 










Proof of Claim 2 For j ∈ {2,3},















which yields the desired result. 










with equality if m = 0.




































which yields the desired result. 
Let G : (0,1) → Gχ0 denote the policy function mapping the state space (0,1) into the action
sequence space Gχ0, which consists of countably inﬁnite sequence. We apply the concept of the












Then we deduce the following result:
Claim 4 Suppose that V (H
m,m+1
i ;{i(m),1(∞)}) = V (H
m,m+1




























Proof of Claim 4 We can derive this result directly using the function V . 
6.1.3 Proposition and Proof
In this section we present the main proposition, and then show their proof by applying the
backwards iteration. We ﬁrst show the preliminary result in the case in which the state variable
Ht is close enough to its asymptotic limit.
Lemma 7 There exists some value ¯ H ∈ (0,1), close enough to unity, such that G(H) = {1(∞)}
for any H ∈ ( ¯ H,1)
Proof of Lemma 7 Suppose, to get a contradiction, that {1(∞)} is not an optimal policy for
any H ∈ (0,1). Pick any H¯ t ∈ (0,1) as the state variable in period ¯ t such that




and the optimal action in period ¯ t is not G1. Without loss of generality, we assume that G(H¯ t) =
G2. Then, it must hold that Hs ∈ (1 − ,1) for all s > ¯ t, which implies that
















30since R1 > R2 > R3 and Hs ∈ (0,1). Also, since H¯ t ∈ [1 − ,1), v(H¯ t) must satisfy








































Thus, for any H close enough to unity, G1 is optimal, i.e., G(H) = {1(∞)}. 
By Lemma 7 and Claims 2 and 4, we can deduce the following result:









for any H ∈ (H1,1), and
V (H,{1
(∞)}) < V (H,{i
(1),1
(∞)}),
for any H ∈ (0,H1). By Lemma 7 and Claim 2, there exists some value ¯ H ∈ (0,1), close to













(∞)}) < V (1;{2
(1),1
(∞)}) < V (1;{1
(∞)}).












(∞)})} < V (H;{1
(∞)})
for H ∈ (H
0,1




2 and for H ∈ (H
0,1











3 }, we obtain the desired result. 













2 , then G(H) = {1(∞)} for any H ∈ (H
0,1





G(H) = {1(∞)} for any H ∈ (H
0,1
3 ,1). We consider the second case to examine subcase B-I in




3 . Then, the main result is:




3 . Then, G(H) = G3 if H ∈ (0,H
0,1




To prove this proposition, it is suﬃcient to show the following lemma:




3 . Then, G(H) = {1(∞)} if H ∈ (H
0,1
3 ,1), and G(H) =




3 ) for any n ∈ {1,2,···}.
We apply the mathematical induction to this problem. We ﬁrst examine the case of n = 1, and





To do so, we deduce the following result.
Claim 5 Suppose that G(H) = {1(∞)} for any H ∈ (H
0,1
3 ,1). Then, {2(m),1(∞)} is not optimal
for any m ∈ {1,2,···} and any H ∈ (0,1).


















(∞)})} > V (H;{2
(1),1
(∞)}),
which implies that {2(1),1(∞)} is not optimal. Next we will show that if {2(1),1(∞)} is not op-
timal, then {2(m),1(∞)} is not optimal for any m ∈ {1,2,···}. To see this, suppose, to get a
contradiction, that there exists some positive integer ¯ m > 1 such that {2( ¯ m),1(∞)} is optimal for
some ¯ H ∈ (0,1). Then, for any m ∈ {1,··· , ¯ m − 1}, there exists some ˜ Hm ∈ (0,1) such that
{2(m),1(∞)} is optimal, which contradicts to the fact that {2(1),1(∞)} is not optimal. 
We now examine the case of n = 1.
Claim 6 {i(1),3(1),1(∞)} is not optimal for any H ∈ (0,1) and for any i ∈ {1,2}.


















by Claim 3, there exists some ¯ H ∈ (H
0,1
3 ,1) such that
V ( ¯ H;{1




32which contradicts to the assumption that G(H) = {1(∞)} for any H ∈ (H
0,1
3 ,1). 







(∞)}) = V (H
0,1
3 ;{1

















Then, there exists some ¯ H ∈ (H
0,1
3 ,1) such that {2(1),3(1),1(∞)} is optimal for ¯ H, which contra-
dicts to the fact that {1(∞)} is optimal for H ∈ (H
0,1
3 ,1). 
Claim 8 Suppose that G(H) = {1(∞)} for any H ∈ (H
0,1













3 ;{2(1),3(1),1(∞)}) < V (H
1,2
3 ;{3(1),1(∞)}).
Proof of Claim 8 By Claim 7, it must hold that V (H
0,1
3 ;{3(1),1(∞)}) ≥ V (H
0,1
3 ;{2(1),3(1),1(∞)}).





3 ;{3(1),1(∞)}). Therefore, we derive the desired result. 
Claim 9 Suppose that G(H) = {1(∞)} for any H ∈ (H
0,1
3 ,1). Then, G(H) = {3(1),1(∞)} for




3 ) if V (H
1,2
3 ;{2(1),3(1),1(∞)}) < V (H
1,2
3 ;{3(1),1(∞)}).
Proof of Claim 9 Suppose that V (H
1,2
3 ;{2(1),3(1),1(∞)}) < V (H
1,2
3 ;{3(1),1(∞)}). Then, by




3 ). Also, by Claim 6,




3 ). Note also that G(H) = {1(∞)}






(∞)})} < V (H;{3
(1),1
(∞)}),




3 ), that Ht+1 = 1 − M3(1 − H) ∈ (H
0,1




3 ), and that










3 . Then, V (H
1,2
3 ;{2(1),3(1),1(∞)}) < V (H
1,2
3 ;{3(1),1(∞)}).
Proof of Claim 10 Deﬁne the function
Γ(H) ≡ V (H;{3
(1),1




33We need to show that Γ(H
1,2




3 . Note that
Γ(H) = (R3 − R2) + β(R1 − R3) + (1 − H)[R2 − R3 − βM3A1(1 − βM2) + βM2A3(1 − βM3)],














1 − β(M2 − M3) −
(1 − βM2)(A1 − A2)
(1 − βM3)(A1 − A3)





1 − β(M2 − M3) −
(1 − βM2)R1 − (1 − βM1)R2
(1 − βM3)R1 − (1 − βM1)R3

.
Given (R1,M1) and (R3,M3), deﬁne ¯ Γ(R2,M2|(R1,M1),(R3,M3)) ≡ Γ(H
1,2
3 ). Then, it is obvious
that ¯ Γ(R2,M2|(R1,M1),(R3,M3)) = 0 is as an aﬃne function with respect to (R2,M2). Since




[(1 − M3) − β(M1 − M3)] >
R1 − R3
M3
(M1 − M3)(1 − β) > 0;
¯ Γ(R1,M3) = −(R1 − R3) < 0;
it is easy to show that the aﬃne function ¯ Γ(R2,M2) = 0 passes through (R3,ν3) and some point
between (R1,ν1) and (R1,ν3) on the (R2,ν2)−plane, and that any point in the area, denoted by
Γ, below the line ¯ Γ(R2,M2) = 0 satisﬁes ¯ Γ(R2,M2) > 0. Let




3 , R1 > R2 > R3 and ν1 < ν2 < ν3}




3 . Since this set Λ is
represented by the triangle whose points are (R1,ν1), (R3,ν3) and (R3,ν1), we have that Λ ⊂ Γ.




3 , then Γ(H
1,2











which is the desired result. 
From the above analysis, we deduce the following result related to the case of n = 1 in Lemma
9.









Proof of Lemma 10 From Claims 9 and 10, we derive the desired result. 
We now suppose that
G(H) = {3
(m),1









3 . Then, we consider the case of n = m + 1.















Proof of Claim 11 Consider the policy {1(1),3(m),1(∞)}. Suppose, to get a contradiction,




3 ). By Claims 1 and














3 ) such that {1(1),3(m),1(∞)} is optimal, which con-





consider the policy {2(1),3(m),1(∞)}. Suppose, to get a contradiction, that {2(1),3(m),1(∞)} is an















3 ) such that {2(1),3(m),1(∞)} is optimal, which














Then, the optimal policy can be represented as {l∗,3(m+1),1(∞)} for any H ∈ (0,H
m,m+1
3 ), where
l∗ is a ﬁnite sequence, possibly empty, of elements from G.
Proof of Claim 12 From Claim 11, we already know that {1(1),3(m),1(∞)} and {2(1),3(m),1(∞)}




3 ). Since M1 > M2 > M3, there




3 ) if the initial state variable is less than
H
m+1,m+2
3 . In this case, the optimal policy can be represented as {l,3(m+1),1(∞)}, where l is a





3 , the optimal policy can be represented as {l,3(m+1),1(∞)}, where
l is a ﬁnite sequence of elements from G, but may be empty. 














Proof of Claim 13 By Claim 12, we know that the optimal policy can be represented as




3 ), where l∗ is a ﬁnite sequence, possibly empty,



























3 ) such that
V ( ¯ H;{3
(m),1
















































3 ) such that {2(1),3(m+1),1(∞)} is optimal for ¯ H,



























3 ;{2(1),3(m+1),1(∞)}) < V (H
m+1,m+2
3 ;{3(m+1),1(∞)}).
















3 ;{3(m+1),1(∞)}). Therefore, we derive the desired result. 



















Proof of Claim 16 Suppose that V (H
m+1,m+2
3 ;{2(1),3(m+1),1(∞)}) < V (H
m+1,m+2
3 ;{3(m+1),1(∞)}).









3 ). Note also









(∞)})} < V (H;{3
(m+1),1
(∞)}),




3 ), and H0 = 1−M3(1−H) ∈ (H
m,m+1






























Proof of Claim 17 Deﬁne the function
Γm(H) ≡ V (H;{3
(m+1),1




We need to show that Γm(H
m+1,m+2




3 . Note that
Γm(H) =β
m+1(R1 − R2) − (1 − β
m+1)(R2 − R3)
+ (1 − H)[R2 − (1 − βM2)[(βM3)
m+1A1 + (1 − (βM3)
m+1)A3],












3 ) = β
m+1(R1 − R2) − (1 − β
m+1)(R2 − R3)
+
(R1 − R3)(1 − βM2)
M
m+1
3 (1 − βM3)(A1 − A3)
[A2 − (βM3)
m+1A1 − (1 − (βM3)
m+1)A3].
For given (R1,M1) and (R3,M3), Γm(H
m+1,m+2
3 ) ≡ ¯ Γm(R2,M2 : R1,M1,R3,M3) = 0 is regarded
as an aﬃne function with respect to (R2,M2) or (R2,ν2). Note that
¯ Γm(R3,M3) =β
m+1(R1 − R3) − β







3 (1 − βM3)(A1 − A3)
{R3 − (1 − βM1)[(βM3)
m+1A1 + (1 − (βM3)
m+1)A3]}
=
β(R1 − R3)(M1 − M3)
M
m+1
3 (1 − βM3)(A1 − A3)
[(βM3)
m+1A1 + (1 − (βM3)
m+1)A3] > 0.
Also, it must hold that ¯ Γm(R1,M1) > 0. To see this, note that































3 ) such that
V ( ¯ H;{3
(m),1









Thus, it must hold that ¯ Γm(R1,M1) > 0. Therefore, since ¯ Γm(R3,M3) = 0, ¯ Γm(R3,M1) > 0
and ¯ Γm(R1,M1) > 0, it is easy to show that the aﬃne function ¯ Γm(R,M) = 0 does not pass
through any point in the triangle that is connected by (R1,ν1), (R3,ν3) and (R3,ν1) on the
(R2,ν2)−plane. Let




3 , R1 > R2 > R3 and ν1 < ν2 < ν3}




3 . Then, it must hold that
¯ Γm(R2,M2) ≥ 0 for any (R2,M2) ∈ Λ.




3 , then Γm(H
m+1,m+2











which is the desired result. 
From the above analysis, we deduce the following result under the assumption that G(H) =




3 ), which corresponds to the case of n = m + 1 in
Lemma 9.














Proof of Lemma 11 From Claims 16 and 17, we derive the desired result. 
We now summarizes the proof of Lemma 9 as follows:




3 , G(H) = {1(∞)} for any H ∈ (H
0,1
3 ,1).




3 ). By Lemma 11, if G(H) =








3 , then G(H) = {3(m+1),1(∞)} for













3 ) for any n ∈ {1,2,···}. 
386.2 Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions in Section 4
Proof of Lemma 1 Suppose that the government chooses action I (Gt = G1) in period t.
By equations (3) and (5), the industry-speciﬁc factor is az,t = a0, and the (expected) industry-
speciﬁc productivity index is E(z,t) = 1 for any industry z ∈ [0,1]. The conditions (10) and
(11) yield the equilibrium wage rate w∗
t = µH(a0/¯ L)1−µ and the equilibrium labor employment
l∗
z,t = ¯ L in any industry z ∈ [0,1]. Then, the total labor employment in learning industries and
the (expected) national income are
L
∗
A,t = K¯ L; g
e




Suppose that the government chooses action II (Gt = G2) in period t. There is no red tape
and no loss in the industry-speciﬁc productivity index under non-elaborate monitoring. However,
due to rent-seeking, part of non-learning industries becomes eligible for promotion support so
that D(0) = [0,(1 + λ)K]. By equations (3), (4) and (5), the industry-speciﬁc factor and the
expected industry-speciﬁc productivity index are
az,t =
(
a0 − τ + τ−c
K(1+λ) if z ∈ [0,K(1 + λ)]
a0 − τ if z ∈ (K(1 + λ),1]
; E(z,t) = 1 for all z ∈ [0,1].
The conditions (10) and (11) yield the equilibrium wage rate w∗







a0−c ¯ L if z ∈ [0,K(1 + λ)]
a0−τ
a0−c ¯ L if z ∈ (K(1 + λ),1].








t = Ht¯ L
µ(a0 − c)
1−µ.
Suppose that the government chooses action III (Gt = G3) in period t. Since there is no rent-
seeking activities under elaborate monitoring, only learning industries are eligible for promotion
support so that D(1) = [0,K]. However, such monitoring gives rise to red tape that reduces
the productivity index in eligible industries. By equations (3), (4) and (5), the industry-speciﬁc
factor and the expected industry-speciﬁc productivity index are
az,t =
(
a0 − τ + τ−c
K if z ∈ [0,K]
a0 − τ if z ∈ (K,1]
; E(z,t) =
(
1 − θη if z ∈ [0,K]
1 if z ∈ (K,1].
The conditions (10) and (11) yield the equilibrium wage rate w∗







B ¯ L if z ∈ [0,K]
a0−τ
B ¯ L if z ∈ (K,1],
where B ≡ [K(1 − θη)1/(1−µ) + 1 − K](a0 − τ) + K(1 − θη)1/(1−µ)(τ − c). Then, the total labor








t = Ht¯ L
µB
1−µ. 
Proof of Corollary 1 Notice that L∗
A,t(Ht,1,0) depends on λ, and L∗
A,t(Ht,1,1) and ge
t(Ht,1,1)
depend on θ. Diﬀerentiating L∗
A,t(Ht,1,0) with respect to λ and diﬀerentiating L∗
A,t(Ht,1,1) and
ge
t(Ht,1,1) with respect to θ yield the desired results. 




2) = ¯ L
µ[a
1−µ
0 − (a0 − τ + K¯ δ)
1−µ] > 0,





µ[(a0 − τ + K¯ δ)
1−µ − {[K(1 − θη)
1





(a0 − τ + K¯ δ) − {[K(1 − θη)
1
1−µ + 1 − K](a0 − τ) + K(1 − θη)
1
1−µ¯ δ}
=K[1 − (1 − θη)
1
1−µ](a0 − τ + ¯ δ)
=K[1 − (1 − θη)
1
1−µ](a0 − c + τ(1 − K)/K) > 0,
it must hold that R(G2) > R(G3). Thus, R(G1) > R(G2) > R(G3). Next We show that
L∗
A(G1) < L∗







1) = K¯ L
 ¯ δ(1 − K(1 + λ))
(1 + λ)(a0 − τ + K¯ δ)

> 0,
it must hold that L∗
A(G2) > L∗
A(G1). 
Proof of Lemma 3 It is ﬁrst shown that for any λ ∈ (0,1/K −1), there exists a unique value
ψ(λ) ∈ (0,1] such that L∗
A(G2) < L∗
A(G3) for any θ ∈ (0,ψ(λ)) and L∗
A(G2) > L∗
A(G3) for any
θ ∈ (ψ(λ),1]. Let A(θ) ≡ (1 − θη)1/(1−µ) ∈ [(1 − η)
1
1−µ,1) and let ¯ δ = δ(1) = (τ − c)/K. Then,







2) = K¯ L[C(θ) − D(λ)],
where
C(θ) =
A(θ)(a0 − τ + ¯ δ)
(KA(θ) + 1 − K)(a0 − τ) + KA(θ)¯ δ
; D(λ) =
a0 − τ + ¯ δ/(1 + λ)
a0 − τ + K¯ δ
.
40Notice that
C(0) = D(0) =
a0 − τ + ¯ δ
a0 − τ + K¯ δ




(1 − K)(a0 − τ)(a0 − τ + ¯ δ)K¯ L










(a0 − τ + K¯ δ)(1 + λ)2 < 0.
Pick any λ ∈ (0,1/K−1). There are two possible cases; D(λ) ≤ C(1) and D(λ) > C(1). Suppose
that D(λ) ≤ C(1). Since C(θ) is decreasing in θ, it must hold that C(θ)−D(λ) > C(1)−D(λ) ≥ 0
and hence L∗
A(G3) > L∗
A(G2) for any θ ∈ (0,1]. Next suppose that D(λ) > C(1). Note that
D(0) = C(0) > D(λ). Since C(θ) is decreasing in θ, there exists a unique value of ψ(λ) ∈ (0,1)
such that C(θ) > D(λ) for any θ ∈ (0,ψ(λ)) and C(θ) < D(λ) for any θ ∈ (ψ(λ),1]. Thus, it must
hold that L∗
A(G3) > L∗
A(G2) for any θ ∈ (0,ψ(λ)) and L∗
A(G3) < L∗
A(G2) for any θ ∈ (ψ(λ),1].
For convenience, deﬁne ψ(λ) = 1 for any λ satisfying D(λ) ≤ C(1). Then, the desired result is
derived. Also, not that if C(θ) < D(λ) or ψ(λ) < 1, then C(ψ(λ)) = D(λ). Then, it must hold
that ∂ψ(λ)/∂λ = D0(λ)/C0(θ) > 0, which implies that ψ(λ) is increasing in λ. 











Plugging (ν,R) = (ν(L∗
A(G3)),R(G3)) into the above equation, the condition of subcase B-I is
that the left-hand side is larger than the right-hand side, while the condition of subcase B-II is
that the left-hand side is smaller than the right-hand side. We denote the left-hand side minus
the right-hand side by W(ν,R). Then, to prove the ﬁrst part, it is enough to show that for any
λ ∈ (0,1/K−1), there exists a unique value ϕ(λ) ∈ (0,ψ(λ)] such that W(ν(L∗
A(G3)),R(G3)) > 0
for θ ∈ (0,ϕ(λ)) and W(ν(L∗







Note that κ2 ≡ κ2(λ) and κ3 ≡ κ3(θ) depend on λ and θ, respectively. Pick any λ ∈ (0,1/K−1).
Deﬁne the diﬀerence between κ2(λ) and κ3(θ) by




where R1 = R(G1), R2 = R(G2), ν1 = ν(L∗
A(G1)) and ν2 = ν(L∗
A(G2)) are independent of θ, and
R(G3) = R3(θ) and ν3(θ) = ν(L∗














41since R1 > R3(θ) and ν3(θ) > ν1 by the assumption of (ν,R), and since ∂R3(θ)/∂θ < 0 and
∂ν3(θ)/∂θ < 0. Also, we have that
D(0) =
(R1 − R2)(ν3(0) − ν2)
ν2 − ν1
> 0,
since R3(0) = R2. Thus, for given λ, D(θ) is decreasing in θ. Note that if θ > ψ(λ), then obviously
D(0) < 0. Therefore, setting ϕ(λ) such that D(ϕ(λ)) = 0 with ϕ(λ) < ψ(λ) or D(ϕ(λ)) > 0
with ϕ(λ) = ψ(λ), where ϕ(λ) = min{1,ψ(λ)}, it must hold that there exists a unique value
ϕ(λ) ∈ (0,ψ(λ)) such that D(θ) > 0 for θ ∈ (0,ϕ(λ)) and D(θ) < 0 for θ ∈ (ϕ(λ),ψ(λ)). Since
D(θ) ≷ 0 is equivalent to W ≷ 0, the desired result can be obtained.
We next show that the critical value ϕ(λ) is increasing in λ. By D(ϕ(λ)) = 0, taking the





















which implies that the critical value ϕ(λ) is increasing in λ. 
Proof of Proposition 1 First, we show the following claim.
Claim 18 Suppose that there are two government actions ¯ Gt = (¯ St, ¯ Mt) and ˆ Gt = (ˆ St, ˆ Mt) such
that L∗
A( ¯ Gt) < L∗
A( ˆ Gt) and R( ¯ Gt) < R( ˆ Gt). Then, ¯ Gt is never optimal for any Ht ∈ (0,1).
Proof of Claim 18 Using ge(Ht,St,Mt) = HtR(St,Ht), the function ˆ v(Ht,St,Mt) is deﬁned
as:
ˆ v(Ht,St,Mt) ≡ HtR(St,Mt) + βv(Ht+1),
subject to Hs+1 = 1−[1−ν(L∗
A(Ss,Ms))](1−Hs) for s ∈ {t,t+1,...}. The value of ˆ v(Ht,St,Mt)
represents the sum of expected national income from period t under the optimal policy taking
government action (St,Mt) in period t as given. We need to show that if LA(¯ St, ¯ Mt) < LA(ˆ St, ˆ Mt)
and R(¯ St, ¯ Mt) < R(ˆ St, ˆ Mt), then it must hold that ˆ v(Ht, ¯ St, ¯ Mt) < ˆ v(Ht, ˆ St, ˆ Mt) for all Ht ∈
(0,1). It is enough to show that:







A(¯ St, ¯ Mt),Ht) and H00
t+1 = h(L∗
A(ˆ St, ˆ Mt),Ht). By the assumption, we already
know that R(¯ St, ¯ Mt) < R(ˆ St, ˆ Mt). The remaining is to show that v(H0
t+1) < v(H00
t+1). Suppose,
to get a contradiction, that v(H0
t+1) ≥ v(H00










t+1+sR(˜ St+1+s, ˜ Mt+1+s),
42where H0
t+1 = h(L∗
A(¯ St, ¯ Mt),Ht) and H0
l+1 = h(L∗
A(˜ Sl, ˜ Ml),H0
l) for l ≥ t + 2. Then, since
v(H0
t+1) ≥ v(H00
t+1), for {˜ St+s, ˜ Mt+s}∞















t+1+sR(˜ St+1+s, ˜ Mt+1+s),
where H00
t+1 = h(L∗
A(ˆ St, ˆ Mt),Ht) and H00
l+1 = h(L∗
A(˜ Sl, ˜ Ml),H00
l ) for l ≥ t + 2. By the assumption
that LA(¯ St, ¯ Mt) < LA(ˆ St, ˆ Mt), it must hold that H0
t+1 < H00
t+1. By Assumption 2, we have that









t+2 = [1 − ν(L
∗









Similarly, we can deduce H00
t+l > H0












t+1+sR(˜ St+1+s, ˜ Mt+1+s),
which contradicts to the assumption that v(H0
t+1) ≥ v(H00
t+1). Therefore, it must hold that
v(H0
t+1) < v(H00
t+1), and hence ˆ v(Ht, ¯ St, ¯ Mt) < ˆ v(Ht, ˆ St, ˆ Mt) for all Ht ∈ (0,1). 
The expected national income ge
t = HtR(Gt) can be regarded as a current reward, and the
total employment L∗
A(Gt) in learning industries as the value related to future rewards through
human capital accumulation. Thus, the government prefers a pair of higher ge
t and higher L∗
A,t
by choosing its action Gt in each period. If a government action achieves lower expected national
income per unit of human capital and lower speed of human capital accumulation than another
action, such an action cannot be optimal. We call it a dominated government action.
By Lemma 2, action I (G1) is never dominated. For any Ht ∈ (0,1), deﬁne the value when







subject to Hs+1 = 1 − [1 − ν(L∗
A(G1))](1 − Hs). And for each Gi ∈ G (i 6= 1), deﬁne the value
when he chooses action i (Gi) in period t and then action I forever from period t + 1 by
vi1(Ht) = HtR(G
i) + βv1(Ht+1), (17)
and Ht+1 = 1−[1−ν(L∗
A(Gi))](1−Ht) and Ht+l+1 = 1−[1−ν(L∗
A(G1))](1−Ht+l) for all l ≥ 1.





























43where M(Gj) = 1 − ν(L∗
A(Gj)) for each Gj ∈ G.
Consider case A in which the economy has relatively small degree of rent-seeking activities
and relatively large demand variability such that θ ∈ (ψ(λ),1]. From Lemmas 2 and 3 and Claim
18, action III (G3 = (1,1)) is dominated by action II (G2 = (1,0)) so that the government can
restrict itself into a binary choice between actions I and II. The cost of elaborate monitoring is
always relatively high compared to its beneﬁt so that elaborate monitoring cannot be justiﬁed.
Figure 5 (the upper part) illustrates this situation on (ν,R) space, where point C representing
the result of government action G3 is within the shaded area, i.e., G3 is dominated by G2.
Since R(G1) > R(G2) and ν(L∗
A(G1)) < ν(L∗
A(G2)), the government faces the trade-oﬀ be-
tween the current reward and the future reward that is determined by the total employment in
learning industries in each period. Then, the following claim is obtained:
Claim 19 Suppose that the ﬂexibility issue is relatively signiﬁcant such that θ ∈ (ψ(λ),1]. Then,
there exists a unique value ˆ H ∈ (0,1) such that the adoption of promotion support without
elaborate monitoring is optimal for H ∈ (0, ˆ H), and a laissez faire policy is optimal for H ∈
( ˆ H,1).
Proof of Claim 19 For this proof, we follow the discussion of the optimal stopping region in
Dixit and Pyndyck Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Suppose that θ ∈ (ψ(λ),1]. We ﬁrst examine the
impossibility of multiple policy changes. To show this, we pay attention to the case of a binary
choice between policy A (setting G1 forever) and policy B (setting G2 now). Now consider the
following Bellman equation:
V (H) = max{v1(H),HR(G




Policy A is optimal for those values of H for the maximum on the right-hand side is attained at
the ﬁrst argument, that is,
v1(H) > HR(G




and policy B is optimal if the opposite inequality holds. We call the corresponding divisions of
the range of H the policy A region and the policy B region, respectively. We will show that
there exists a unique value ˆ H ∈ [0,1] such that G(H) = G2 for H ∈ [0, ˆ H) and G(H) = G1 for
H ∈ ( ˆ H,1], that is, it is impossible to have the case in which the regions could be any sequence
of alternating intervals. And there is a clean division of the range into low and high values
separated by a threshold, say ˆ H, such that policy A is optimal for H ∈ [ ˆ H,1] and policy B is
optimal for H ∈ [0, ˆ H], i.e., the value function of this problem is equivalent to the original value
function; V (H) = v(H) for all H ∈ [0,1].
Denoting V (H) − v1(H) by Ω(H), we have that
Ω(H) = max{0, HR(G










2 = 1 − [1 − ν(L∗







1 − β[1 − ν(L∗
A(G2))]








1 − β[1 − ν(L∗
A(G2))]






The function F is just the diﬀerence between the value of waiting for exactly one period before
changing the policy, and that of changing right away. Since F 0 < 0, F is strictly decreasing.
By decreasing property of F, the solution function Ω(H) must be decreasing. To see this, note
that the second argument of the max operator on the right-hand side consists of two parts. The
ﬁrst is decreasing in H, as we have already shown. The second is decreasing if Ω(H) is. Thus,
starting with a decreasing function, the right-hand side yields another increasing function, Then,
the ﬁxed point of the iteration step is itself a decreasing function. Since the second argument is
decreasing, there is a unique ˆ H ∈ [0,1] such that the second argument is positive if and only if
H ∈ [0, ˆ H). Thus, G(H) = G2 if H ∈ [0, ˆ H) and G(H) = G1 if H ∈ ( ˆ H,1]. 
The threshold value ˆ H in Claim 19 must satisfy the condition that the value of setting action
I forever equals the value of setting action II now and action I forever, that is,
v1( ˆ H) = v21( ˆ H). (20)
Let mi = [1−βM(Gi)]/[1−βM(G1)] = [1−β(1−ν(L∗
A(Gi)))]/[1−β(1−ν(L∗
A(G1)))] > 1 and
ri = R(G1)/R(Gi) > 1 for each i ∈ {2,3}. By equations (18), (19) and (20), ˆ H satisﬁes:
R1
1 − β
















Solving this for ˆ H, we can derive equation (14). And also, since m2 > 1 and r2 > 1, it must hold










(rm − 1)2 > 0.
Since ∂L∗















which implies that ˆ H is decreasing in λ. 
Proof of Proposition 2 Consider subcase B-I in which the rent-seeking issue is relatively
signiﬁcant so that θ ∈ (0,ϕ(λ)), as shown in area B-I in Figure 4 and Figure 6 (the upper
part). After examining the dynamic decision problem with a trinary case, the following claim is
obtained.
Claim 20 Suppose that the rent-seeking issue is relatively signiﬁcant such that θ ∈ (0,ϕ(λ)).
Then, there exists a unique value ˜ H ∈ (0,1) such that the adoption of promotion support with
elaborate monitoring is optimal for H ∈ (0, ˜ H), and a laissez faire policy is optimal for H ∈
45( ˜ H,1).
Proof of Claim 20 Suppose that θ ∈ (0,ϕ(λ)). Note that
H
0,1



























3 . From Result 1, there exists a unique value ˜ H ∈ (0,1) such that G(H) = G3 for
H ∈ (0, ˜ H) and G(H) = G1 for H ∈ ( ˜ H,1). 
Similarly as in case A, the threshold value ˜ H in Claim 20 must satisfy the condition that the
value of setting action I forever equals the value of setting action III now and action I forever,
that is,
v1( ˜ H) = v31( ˜ H). (21)
Equations (18), (19) and (21) yield equation (15):
H
0,1














(r3m3 − 1)2 > 0.
Note that θ aﬀects both L∗
A(G3) and R(G3) when the government action is action III. Since
∂L∗















Thus, ˜ H is decreasing in θ. 
Proof of Lemma 5 We will ﬁrst prove that G(H) = G1 for any H ∈ ( ¯ H,1). By Lemma









3 , it must hold that G(H) = {1(∞)} for
any H ∈ ( ¯ H,1), which is the desired result in (1).
Next we will show that there exists some ε ∈ (0, ¯ H) such that G(H) = G2 for any H ∈




3 , it must hold that, for any
H ∈ (0, ¯ H), max{V (H;{3(1),1(∞)}),V (H;{2(1),1(∞)})} > V (H;{1(∞)}). Note that G(H) = G1
for any H ∈ ( ¯ H,1), and that V (·) is an aﬃne function. Then, since ¯ H > H
0,1
3 , it is obvious that
there exists some ε ∈ (0, ¯ H) such that V (H;{3(1),1(∞)}) < V (H;{2(1),1(∞)}) or G(H) = G2 for
any H ∈ ( ¯ H − ε, ¯ H) in (2).
Finally, we will show that there exists some ξ ∈ (0, ¯ H) such that G(H) = G3 for any







t+1(Ht) = 1 − (1 − Ht)[1 − ν(L∗
A(Gi))] for i ∈ {1,2,3}. It is enough to show that there
exists some ξ ∈ (0, ¯ H) such that
ˆ v(Ht,G
3) > max{ˆ v(Ht,G
1), ˆ v(Ht,G
2)},
for any Ht ∈ (0,ξ). For i ∈ {1,2}, deﬁne Ei(Ht) ≡ v(H3
t+1(Ht)) − v(Hi









t+1(Ht), and Ht ∈ (0, ¯ H) ⊂ (0,1), it must
hold that D1 > 0. Let ξ1 ≡ βD1/(R1 − R3) > 0. Then, we have that
ˆ v(Ht,G





t+1(Ht))] − Ht(R1 − R3) = βE1(Ht) − Ht(R1 − R3)
> βD1 − Ht(R1 − R3) = (ξ1 − Ht)(R1 − R3).
Thus, it must hold that ˆ v(Ht,G3) > ˆ v(Ht,G1) for any Ht ∈ (0,ξ1). Similarly, let ξ2 ≡ βD2/(R2−




Then, it must hold that ˆ v(Ht,G3) > ˆ v(Ht,G2) for any Ht ∈ (0,ξ2). Setting ξ ≡ min{ξ1,ξ2} < ¯ H,
it must hold that ˆ v(Ht,G3) > max{ˆ v(Ht,G1), ˆ v(Ht,G2)} for any Ht ∈ (0,ξ). Thus, there exists
some ξ ∈ (0, ¯ H) such that G(H) = G3 for any H ∈ (0,ξ), which is the desired result in (3).






(∞)}) = Ak − (1 − H)Bk,
where



























Claim 21 {1(1),3(n),2(m),1(∞)} = {1(1),l} is not optimal for H0 ∈ (0,1), where l = {3(n),2(m),1(∞)}
with n ∈ {1,2,...} and m ∈ {1,2,...}.
Proof of Claim 21 Pick any n and m with, and pick any H0 ∈ (0,1). Suppose, to get a
contradiction, that {1(1),l} is optimal for H0, i.e., G(H0) = {1(1),l}. Then, it must hold that
V (H0,{1
(1),l}) ≥ V (H0,{l}).
47Since {l} is optimal for H1 = 1 − (1 − H0)[1 − ν(L∗
A(G1))], it must hold that
V (H1,{l}) ≥ V (H1,{1
(1),l}).
Since V is an aﬃne function, it must hold that
Y (1) ≡ lim
H→1−




However, it must hold that
Y (1) = −(1 − β
n+m)R1 + (1 − β
n)R3 < −(1 − β
n)(R1 − R3) < 0,
which contradicts to the fact that Y (1) ≥ 0. Thus, {1(1),3(n),2(m),1(∞)} = {1(1),l} is not optimal
for H0 ∈ (0,1). 
Claim 22 {1(1),i(m),1(∞)} = {1(1),l} is not optimal for H0 ∈ (0,1) with m ∈ {1,2,...} and
i ∈ {2,3}.
Proof of Claim 22 Pick any m with, and pick any H0 ∈ (0,1). Suppose, to get a contradiction,
that {1(1),l} is optimal for H0, i.e., G(H0) = {1(1),l}. Then, it must hold that
V (H0,{1
(1),l}) ≥ V (H0,{l}).
Since {l} is optimal for H1 = 1 − (1 − H0)[1 − ν(L∗
A(G1))], it must hold that
V (H1,{l}) ≥ V (H1,{1
(1),l}).
Since V is an aﬃne function, it must hold that
Y (1) ≡ lim
H→1−




However, it must hold that
Y (1) = −(1 − β
n)(R1 − Ri) < 0,
which contradicts to the fact that Y (1) ≥ 0. Thus, {1(1),i(m),1(∞)} is not optimal for H0 ∈ (0,1)
and i ∈ {2,3}. 
Claim 23 {2(1),3(1),l,1(∞)} is not optimal for H0 ∈ (0,1).
Proof of Claim 23 Suppose, to get a contradiction, that {2(1),3(1),l,1(∞)} is optimal for H0,
i.e., G(H0) = {2(1),3(1),l,1(∞)}. Then it must hold that
v(H0) = H0R2 + β[1 − (1 − H0)M2]R3 + β
2v(1 − (1 − H0)M2M3)
> H0R3 + β[1 − (1 − H0)M3]R2 + β
2v(1 − (1 − H0)M2M3).
48Thus, we have that
H0 > 1 −
(1 − β)(R2 − R3)
(1 − βM3)R2 − (1 − βM2)R3
.
Let H2 = 1 − (1 − H0)M2. This yields
H2 > 1 −
(1 − β)M2(R2 − R3)
(1 − βM3)R2 − (1 − βM2)R3
≡ H
0.
Since G(H2) = G3 by the assumption and G(H) = G1 for any H ∈ ( ¯ H,1) by Lemma 5 (1), it
must hold that
H
0 < H2 < ¯ H.
However, it contradicts to the assumption of ¯ H < H0. Therefore, {2(1),3(1),l,1(∞)} is not optimal
for H0. 
We now show that the optimal sequence of government actions can be given as {3(n),2(m),1(∞)}
with n ∈ {0,1,...} and m ∈ {0,1,...}. We ﬁrst show that once G1 is optimal, neither G2 nor G3
are optimal in any future period. Suppose, to get a contradiction, that {1(1),l,1(∞)} is optimal
for some H ∈ (0,1), where l includes elements of 2 or/and 3. By Claim 22, l can be neither 3(m)
nor 2(m). By Claim 23, G3 never follows G2. Thus, l can be represented as {3(m),2(n)}. However,
by Claim 21, {1(1),l,1(∞)} cannot be optimal. This contradicts to the assumption. Therefore,
the optimal sequence of government actions can be represented as {3(n),2(m),1(∞)}. 
Proof of Proposition 3 By Lemma 5 (1) and G(H) = G3, the optimal sequence of government
actions is described as G(H) = {3(1),l,1(∞)}, where l is a ﬁnite sequence from G. By Lemma
5 (2), l may include an element of 2. By Lemma 5 (3), there exists some H ∈ (0,1) such
that G(H) = G3. Thus, by Lemma 6, l can be written in the form of l = {3(n),2(m)}, where
n ∈ {0,1,...} and m ∈ {0,1,...}. If m = 0, then G(H) = {3(n+1),1(∞)}, i.e., exact one policy
reform from G3 to G1 is adopted in some future period in the optimal sequence. If m 6= 0, then
G(H) = {3(n+1),2(m),1(∞)}, i.e., two policy reforms (the one from G3 to G2 and then the other
from G2 to G1) are adopted in some future periods in the optimal sequence. 
Proof of Corollary 2 From Propositions 1 and 3 and Lemma 5 (1), the desired result is
obtained. 
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Figure 3: Government Action and Industry-Specific Productivity Index 
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Figure 4: Critical Value under Promotion Support  
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